Paul van Tongeren on friendship and nihilism
Philosophy of Love & Friendship Reflective Response 2021
Love and friendship are key human experiences that merit a long history of discussion, specifically in regard to humanness, relationships, politics, and ethics. Dialogue concerning these experiences have popularly taken place through works of philosophy, theology and imaginative literature. In his paper, Kant, Nietzsche and the idealisation of friendship into nihilism, Paul van Tongeren considers what friendship under nihilistic conditions might be by reviewing the stances of philosophers Kant and Nietzsche, as well as relevant ideas depicted in imaginative literature. Coming into a largely undeveloped discussion of the relationship between morality, nihilism and friendship, Tongeren assumes the pessimism of Kant and Nietzsche, and concludes that friendship under such conditions must simply be the sense of not being alone. While I do not believe we live in a truly nihilistic age, Tongeren still causes me to wonder about the relationship between morality, illusion, lenience and friendship.
It is important to first summarise the text in question. In his paper, Tongeren starts by outlining the start of the traditional philosophical view of friendship, popularly credited to Aristotle. Aristotle defines the friend as another self. Friendship serves to multiply the goodness and virtue of a flourishing life – that is, it is “the crowning of all morality’s perfection.” Tongeren focuses on this relationship between morality and friendship and asks if friendship can exist without morality (as is the nihilistic opinion).
For Kant, the traditional ideal of friendship is unattainable in practice. He describes three forms of friendship, which are all impossible. “Friendship based on need” only exists while the friendship cannot fulfil various needs. Additionally, helping a friend forms a debt, so that they cannot be equals in “respect” (which is essential for Kantian friendship). Regarding “friendship based on taste,” pleasure only exists between those who are different, however difference generates annoyance. The highest form, “friendship of disposition,” is characterised by a “morally unlawful” openness to the friend that risks harming them and excluding others.
Moving his attention to Nietzsche, Tongeren considers nihilism in its various forms. Active nihilism aims at the unmasking and destruction of the foundations of “illusory nature” of meaning. To Nietzsche, friendship only exists through deception and illusion. Like Kant, he argues that friends should not be totally open towards one another, and though he criticises friendship, Tongeren notes that he seems to long for it. Nietzsche longs for that which he cannot believe in. He adds that to abandon one’s reverences, including ones ideal of friendship, is to abandon oneself – to lose friendship is to lose oneself.
Tongeren concludes that philosophers are not hopeful regarding a form of friendship under nihilism, so he turns the discussion toward literary imagination. It seems, however, that much literature has the same woes. Only by forgetting the meaningless of existence can one continue to endure life – only friendship can help one endure their nihilistic condition. As phrased by Nietzsche, this is a “paradox of not being allowed to believe in the possibility of what we cannot do without.” In an attempt to overcome this paradox, Tongeren discusses friendship as portrayed by Beckett’s Waiting for Godot. Estragon and Vladimir criticise each other and are overall not well suited, however they rely upon each other to stay alive. The torture in their endless waiting becomes bearable because they have one another. Tongeren concludes then that this is the friendship that survives nihilism: “to know that you’re not all alone.”
With very little discussion being had on the issue, Tongeren’s paper contributes to the philosophical understanding of the nature of friendship by sparking a new concern regarding how one might combine nihilism and friendship. Additionally, modern dialogue regarding the Kantian and Nietzschean position on friendship is limited. Tongeren, by drawing attention to these philosophers, aids the philosophical understanding of friendship. He asks, “whether friendship is possible within morality.”
For Kant, the motives to action in man are self-love and love for humanity – these are in deep opposition. However, synthesis of the two would be friendship, as “love of the other, which is so absolutely sure about its being reciprocal, that it is no longer in conflict with self-love.” Similarly, friendship is a union of mutual love and respect (ie equality), which is impossible. Kant also describes three kinds of friendship, which also cannot be realised (as summarised above). For him, friendship is, “man’s refuge in this world from the distrust of his fellows,” and yet, “even to our best friend we must not reveal ourselves in our natural state.” Tongeren explains that, for Kant, true friendship only exists as an ideal and idea. Regardless, it is man’s duty to pursue it. Comparably, Nietzsche holds that friendship is founded on illusion and misjudgement, and ideal friendship is an unreality. Tongeren describes a paradox in Nietzsche’s nihilistic approach to friendship, that we “remain attached to those things that we can, no longer, believe in.” Friendship, if possible, is fragile, as ultimately everyone is alone. Neither Kant nor Nietzsche seem optimistic regarding the survival of idealised friendship under nihilism.
In light of these philosopher’s pessimism, Tongeren’s most important contribution to the understanding of the nature of friendship must be in his appeal to imaginative literature – particularly, Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot. The play features Estragon and Vladimir, who wait by a tree beside the road for Godot, who never comes. The audience is given as little information as the characters, not knowing who Godot is or whether he is coming at all, nor whether this is even the right time/place to meet him. Other characters come and go, displaying cruelty or calls for help. The play is grim, with themes of absurdism, loneliness, indifference, and the meaninglessness of it all. Tongeren considers a scene where Estragon and Vladimir ponder suicide. It would be difficult to end both their lives, and neither of them want to be alone, so they do nothing. Tongeren notes that friendship lessens the feeling of loneliness. While Estragon and Vladimir know little about each other, and do not get along, they need their friendship in order to save each other from the abyss. The meaningless, nihilistic reality becomes bearable.
Tongeren is relatively open about the sources he draws upon in his paper and appears to take care to elaborate upon the Aristotelean philosophical tradition behind Kant and Nietzsche, followed by the Kantian and Nietzschean position, thereby elaborating upon the philosophical tradition behind himself. Tongeren’s claim is that friendship, “in an age in which the great ideal of friendship erodes together with all ideality,” only exists as the knowledge that one is not alone. To make this claim, he draws upon Kant and Nietzsche, and on nihilisms resistant approach to morality and ideals. Tongeren analyses the Kantian and Nietzschean perspective, concluding that both philosophers were pessimistic concerning the reality of idealised friendship.
Kant described friendship as a mere idea, due to moral conflicts impossible (or difficult) to resolve. Additionally, as Andrea Veltman might add, Kant believed that self-disclosure was essential for ideal friendship, and as such, it could never be realised due to the “ultimate untrustworthiness of human beings” (Veltman 2004, 233). Nietzsche, by rejecting the traditional foundations of meaning and the ‘ideal,’ regards friendship an unreality – it is simply another one of man’s convictions that nihilism corrodes. Even then, there is a duty/desire to pursue it, in order to be able to endure the abyss. Tongeren takes this as an indication that, while friendship cannot exist in its traditional form, it must exist (even in a lesser sense), otherwise life would be unbearable.
While Tongeren’s understanding of the Kantian and Nietzschean view seems simplistic, he seems to capture the heart of their approach to friendship well enough for his discussion and central claim. The paper, intending to focus on the nihilistic aspect of their philosophies, was not obliged to detail every sense of their views. His conclusion that both Kant and Nietzsche are pessimistic about the reality of friendship is sufficient for the purposes of his discussion. One must be careful, however, to not take his description of their views as complete. Both philosophers, particularly Kant, made room for a rare form of idealised friendship. Though they were largely sceptical about its ability to be realised, this was not ruled as necessarily impossible. There is much to write on this matter (eg Abbey 1999, Miner 2010, Van Impe 2011) that is beyond the scope of this reflection essay. Regardless, I believe that Tongeren’s assumption of the ultimate pessimism of Kant and Nietzsche, regarding friendship, is valid and suits the purposes of his paper.
Tongeren’s paper is important for a nihilistic society. However, I do not believe that the postmodern West is truly nihilistic, though it is certainty more nihilistic than it has been in the past. Let me distinguish between what I will call “true nihilism,” as the belief and practice “that all values are baseless” and meaningless (Pratt 2010), and simple nihilism, as belief without practice (without proper application). To theorise, in a truly nihilistic world, I would agree with Tongeren that no idealisation of friendship could be actualised. Such a setting would be parallel to Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, in which friendship is marked by a desire to ignore the abyss. Both friend and enemy satisfy the conditions of friendship – to not feel alone. Assuming I lived in a truly nihilistic age, Tongeren’s conclusion would feel nothing short of reality. While perhaps true nihilism does not eradicate friendship altogether, the moral and partial aspect, integral to the traditional understanding/experience of friendship, is lost – it becomes unrecognisable. However, the postmodern world, in practice, is not truly nihilistic. It continues to pursue and believe in ideals, such as friendship. In that sense, Tongeren’s work has little application beyond being an interesting read.
Now, suppose I befriend a truly nihilistic individual. Knowing that he values me just as much as he values his enemies would be disheartening, though it might remove moral pressure in striving to be a “good friend.” Additionally, knowing that, in his eyes, I fulfill my end of the relationship purely by engaging with him, I might not feel obliged to treat him in any particular way. Moreover, if not for my own personal convictions, and my idealised understanding of friendship, I might feel free to mistreat him. Even more so, not having a sense of anything that would prevent him on a moral basis, he might feel free to mistreat me in return. It is difficult to believe that there are many true nihilists to befriend, as opposed to those who are nihilists in belief alone. While these more inconsistent nihilists believe that there is no value or meaning, they might choose to ignore the abyss by acting as if there were – in this way, they understand friendship as it is traditionally idealised. If this is the case, Tongeren might do better to consider more deeply the idealised forms of friendship that Kant and Nietzsche regarded as rare, but possible.
Tongeren’s paper asks an interesting question regarding the relationship between friendship and morality. It seems apparent to me now that friendship has fundamental moral aspects, without which friendship would be unrecognisable, if it were counted as friendship at all. An interesting note, stemming from both Kant and Nietzsche was the rejection of total openness with friendship. The popular conception is that there are no secrets between friends, and that you can tell your friends anything. In my experience, this is wrong. There is a degree of illusion and secrecy that preserves a friendship. I would agree with Kant, however, that friendships that are totally open are of the highest calibre – and this I regard as a component of marriage.
Drawing these to my attention, Tongeren causes me to wonder about the moral nature of friendship. Because it is so difficult to meet idealised friendship, requiring a careful balance between various virtues in tension, perhaps a key component of friendship must be forgiveness. Because friends fail to meet the ideal, friends must be lenient with one another out of respect for their striving to pursue such an ideal for the sake of their friend and for the sake of developing their own virtue. Certainly, friends who hold grudges and plot revenge are not true friends.
I myself am not a nihilist, nor do I know many nihilists, nor do I believe that we live in a nihilistic age (at least not truly). However, Tongeren raises a very interesting discussion. As our world becomes more nihilistic, we must wonder how this could influence our beliefs concerning that which is so important to us. For Aristotle, friendship indicates and fosters virtue and humanness. Even Estragon and Vladimir, the nihilist, longs for friendship, though unrecognisable from the traditional form. Tongeren draws on the scepticism and pessimism of Kant and Nietzsche to demonstrate the incompatibility between nihilism and idealised moral friendship. While I believe in the continuation of belief in idealised friendship today, it seems to me that even moral friendship must have a degree of illusion and secrecy, at least in practice. Perhaps Kant was correct in saying that the careful moderation of virtues in friendship is rarely actualised – and perhaps this is what makes lenience such an important characteristic in idealised friendship.
Van Tongeren, Paul. “Kant, Nietzsche and the idealization of friendship into nihilism.” Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 54, no. 128 (2013): 401-417.
Pratt, Alan. “Nihilism.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2010. https://iep.utm.edu/nihilism/#:~:text=Nihilism%20is%20the%20belief%20that,perhaps%2C%20an%20impulse%20to%20destroy.
Van Impe, Stijn. “Kant on Friendship.” International Journal of Arts and Sciences 4, no. 3 (2011): 127-139.
Veltman, Andrea. “Aristotle and Kant on Self-Disclosure in Friendship.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 38, no. 2 (2004): 225-239.
Abbey, Ruth. “Circles, Ladders and Stars: Nietzsche on Friendship.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2, no. 4 (1999): 50-73.
Miner, Robert C. “Nietzsche on Friendship.” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 1, no. 40 (2010): 47-69.