Boethius' problem of foreknowledge and free will
History of Philosophy: Medieval Essay 2021
The problem of foreknowledge and human free will is a long-standing one. If God is omniscient, humans have no free will in the libertarian sense. In the fifth book of his The Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius articulates his understanding of the problem, and, in discourse with Lady Philosophy, attempts to solve the problem by attributing the quality of timelessness to God’s nature. His solution is a clever one that has sparked much debate and thought. This essay, however, asks whether his solution (and not later modifications of it) adequately solves the problem. It seems that it does not, for it describes an eternalist theory of time, which undermines the goal of preserving libertarian freedom. Even if it were not the case that Boethius presupposes eternalism, the solution struggles to explain how a timeless God might know tensed truths. Responses to these issues only seem to demonstrate that the original Boethian solution requires alteration in order to solve the problem at hand.
The problem of foreknowledge and free will have been articulated in numerous ways by various philosophers and theologians. For some, there is no conflict between them, but for others, the two are wholly incompatible. Boethius, in his description of the problem, starts from a number of assumptions, principally that God is omniscient a priori (and therefore infallible), that to know something is to be certain regarding the truth of it, and that free will should be understood in the libertarian sense (that is, having the ability/power to do otherwise) (Pike, 1965).
If man is truly free, the future is open. The past has no bearing on the future, and any agent is free to choose B or not-B at time t. In Boethius’ view, libertarian free will is essential for attributing moral responsibility to one’s actions, as it is difficult to justly hold one accountable for choices for which they could not have chosen otherwise. The future is indefinite, but knowledge is definite by its very nature – one cannot know that event-B will occur in the future unless it is true that event-B will definitely occur in the future. Additionally, it cannot be within the agent’s power to make it that God’s beliefs are false, as omniscient beings hold no false beliefs (on Boethius’ view, “God cannot in anything be mistaken.”) This is then the problem: either God has knowledge of the future, and the future is definite (negating libertarian free will), or the future is indefinite, and therefore God cannot have knowledge of it (for one cannot be certain about that which is necessarily uncertain).
Boethius, in an attempt to solve this problem, asks how one can have definite knowledge of an indefinite future? He makes the intuitive point that to have knowledge of one’s present actions is not to impose upon their libertarian free will. If I am writing this essay, then it is necessary that I am writing this essay – note that this necessity is no threat to my freedom. Boethius distinguishes between this kind of necessity (conditional) and simple necessity (innate to the nature of things). Both describe certainty, but only simple necessity indicates that an event was certain prior to its occurrence (due to the event’s nature).
Lady Philosophy then develops a “modes of cognition” principle to demonstrate that, “everything that is known is grasped… according to the capacity of those who know it.” She describes a hierarchy of perception (intelligence, reason, imagination, sensation). Higher modes possess all the modes below it, revealing greater truths about the same matter being considered. God is of a higher level of knowing than people because God, Philosophy elaborates, is eternal. Eternity is described as “the complete and perfect possession of illimitable life all at once.” To be eternal is to have the past, present and future existing simultaneously to oneself (that is, He sees “all at once as present”). God’s being and knowing is that of an “eternal present.”
In this way, God knows all things of the past, present and future in the same way that man can know what is present – God does not foreknow anything. God can have knowledge about events that, to our knowledge, are in the future, but to His knowledge, are in the eternal present. So, if knowledge is definite and indicates necessity, God’s knowledge indicates conditional necessity, because all of His knowledge is present to Him. Conditional necessity does not threaten freedom, and so God’s foreknowledge and human libertarian free will are compatible. The problem exists as soon as one assumes that God is temporal, just as man is. Boethius denies this, and as such, overcomes the problem.
It is fair to say that most of the discussion born out of the Boethian solution concerns the concept of timelessness. Many objections argue either that timelessness does not make sense or that it is incompatible with other widely accepted properties of God (Zagzebski, 2017). The debate over the compatibility of foreknowledge and free will is extensive and seemingly unending, and the debate over the Boethian solution in particular is no different (certainty, Boethius leaves much room for objection). One cannot possibly address every objection and affirmation of the Boethian solution within the scope of one short essay.
Many of the most common objections to the Boethian solution have (one might argue) satisfactory and largely unproblematic responses. However, one element that deserves more attention is the role of Boethius’ perception of the nature of time. Though this is debated (as everything appears to be), the Boethian solution seems to imply an eternalist view of time.
Eternalism (or B-theory, tenseless theory) is the idea that the past, present and future all eternally exist and are equally real. It holds that time is static and ontologically symmetrical (Diekemper, 2007). Diekemper writes, “if God can observe all events in time from his eternal perspective, and if his beliefs about those events are tenselessly true, then it would seem to follow that the events themselves must also exist eternally.” If actual future events exist at all, then they exist simpliciter – and for Boethius’ solution, they must exist because otherwise they could not be known by God and God’s view must be the correct view, as the higher knower (Lewis, 1988).
The objection then is that eternalism, along with being counterintuitive, is incompatible with libertarian free will. Eternalism holds that the future is fixed, and in doing this, it threatens to reject the alternative possibilities that are at the heart of libertarian free will as it is understood traditionally. It cannot accommodate the degree of freedom that Boethius may have preferred in order to justify his view that people are moral agents. One might say that Boethius solves the foreknowledge-freedom problem and creates a time-freedom problem, which fails to fulfil the purpose of his discussing the issue in the first place.
Now, if one were to reject this eternalist reading of the Boethian solution in order to preserve a full sense of libertarian free will, there are a number of other serious objections that arise. One of these is that God cannot be truly omniscient, for a timeless being cannot know tensed truths.[1] In reducing tensed sentences into tenseless time-indexed sentences, some sense of the original meaning is lost. There seems to be some aspect of experiential, tensed time which is ineffable, and therefore cannot be known by an atemporal and unchanging God. He has nothing in His own timeless existence which can correspond to a temporal and dynamic world (Diekemper, 2013). Without knowledge of tensed truths, can God truly be regarded as omniscient?
The issue is then that either man cannot have libertarian freedom or God cannot be truly omniscient (in the sense that these are traditionally understood).
A defender of the Boethian solution might object to this in a number of ways. Regarding the nature of time, one might object that either Boethius’ solution does not imply eternalism, or that there is no conflict between eternalism and free will.[2] Largely due to its popularity, many objections to his solution presuppose a presentist (or A-theorist, tensed theory) view of time, which holds that the past, present and future have different properties and do not exist equally (only the present exists). It is clear that presentism has a much more open view of the future and is much better fit for a libertarian view of free will.
Zagzebski argues that if presentism is true, future events can still be observed by God as existing from His eternal viewpoint. Diekemper argues that time is dynamic, but the truth is not (he would modify Boethius’ solution in order to support this view) (Diekemper, 2013). More convincingly, Pike argues that Boethius is merely making an epistemological point when he says that temporal events are present to God (Pike, 1970). This naturally ties into Lady Philosophy’s hierarchy of knowing. Boethius writes that all times are observed by God, and are present to Him, in His eternal knowledge/awareness. God having timeless knowledge of events in time does not have any bearing on the reality of time. He simply has a different perspective. The question of whether future events actually exist is a nonissue in this discussion, so one can safely suppose the presentist view.
The presentist might now argue that while God cannot experience tensed truths, He can know of them. Wierenga would argue that God is factually omniscient, though not propositionally omniscient (Ganssle, n.d.). In another sense, He is conceptually omniscient (knows all effable truths), though not perceptually omniscient (knowing via experience). God can know that “Brian is writing” without, through his lens, having to experience the temporal moment that Brian writes.
The response is then that the Boethian theory of time does not reduce libertarian free will, and God can still be regarded as omniscient without fully grasping tensed truths.
The problem with these objections is largely that they stray from Boethius’ original solution, which is of primary concern in this essay. They demonstrate that his solution is merely a base that must be built upon in order to overcome the conflict between foreknowledge and freedom.
Regarding Pike’s objection to the eternalist interpretation of the solution, while it is true that Boethius is making an epistemological point, the rationale behind it appears to be metaphysical. More accurately, Boethius argues that temporal events are present to God because they are present to God “in the all-encompassing eternal present” – that is, the eternal present which contains all times (Lewis, 1988). Therefore, one can maintain that the Boethian solution implies an eternalist/tenseless theory of time, as God’s timeless knowing is a result of time having this nature. For Lewis, “the existence of an eternal God logically depends on the truth of the tenseless account of time.”
It might then be argued that eternalism and free will are compatible, and that the fixedness of the future does not equate to it being necessary.[3] While this may in fact be the case, it is difficult to see how this freedom would take the form of libertarian free will, as the future is not open in the sense that libertarians (and Boethius) might prefer. The debate over whether humans are moral agents must continue along a new understanding of freedom which may not meet Boethius’ purpose.[4] Such a view, while plausible, would be to modify Boethius’ original solution.
Similarly, for concerns regarding tensed truths, the presentist changes how Boethius likely imagined omniscience. Truly, one could excuse God for not knowing experiential/tensed truths, yet still hold that He is omniscient. However, the idea that God is limited here, and that man could know something that God cannot, is controversial. God is a higher knower, His higher knowledge includes sensational perceptions – however, it seems that, in every logical sense, a timeless God cannot sense the passage of time. It seems that either the solution is eternalist (raising issues over the nature of human freedom), or God’s knowledge is lacking (as He cannot know tensed facts).
The problem of foreknowledge and freedom is one full of literature, the details of which we do not have room for here. Boethius’ solution remains a favourite amongst theists and is arguably one of the neatest solutions to this problem. However, unaltered, Boethian solution leaves much up for debate, particularly in it implying an eternalist view of time. Without this implication, there are only more objections – most notably, how a God outside of time might know tensed truths. It appears that either the implied theory of time cannot accommodate libertarian free will, or God’s timelessness means that He cannot have omniscience as it is traditionally understood. While Boethius’ solution is a clever one, it requires alteration in order to overcome the problem.
[1] This is a nonissue for the eternalist who denies that tensed truths exist.
[2] Due to the shortness of this essay, we will focus on the former.
[3] On Diekemper’s view, debate over this matter is at an impasse.
[4] Depending upon whether Boethius was willing to part with the concept of freedom as “the ability to do otherwise.”
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Marenbon, John, “Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/boethius/
Pike, Nelson. "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action." The Philosophical Review (1965): 27-46.
Zagzebski, Linda, “Foreknowledge and Free Will.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/
Diekemper, Joseph. "Eternity, Knowledge, and Freedom." Religious Studies (2013): 45-64.
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Lewis, Delmas. "Eternity, Time and Timelessness." Faith and Philosophy 5, no. 1 (1988): 72-86.
Ganssle, Gregory E. “God and Time.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://iep.utm.edu/god-time/
Emery, Nina, Ned Markosian, and Meghan Sullivan, “Time.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/time/